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FORMALISM AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY IN
PRINTZ V UNITED STATES: COOPERATION BY
CONSENT
ANDREW S. GOLD*
In Printz v. United States,' the Supreme Court expressly
rejected functionalism as a consideration in the state
sovereignty context, replacing it with a structural formalism. It
is the thesis of this article that academic doubts about the
historical analysis and jurisprudential precedents relied upon
by the Printz majority should not overshadow the relevance of
this change in doctrine. As Chief Justice Rehnquist has
explained, "[w]hen an opinion issues for the Court, it is not
only the result, but also those portions of the opinion necessary
to that result by which we are bound."2 An inviolable
sovereignty rule was necessary to the Printz holding.
Until last year, the Court had firmly repudiated its
nineteenth-century decision, Kentucky v. Dennison,3 for its
absolute prohibition against the commandeering of any state
officer by the federal govemment 4 Nevertheless, former Acting
Solicitor General Walter Dellinger describes his defense of the
Brady Act in Printz v. United States, in the following two
sentences: "I told the Court, 'If you do this, you'll have to bring
back the discredited holding of Kentucky v. Dennison.! And they
Law clerk to Chief Judge Loren A. Smith, United States Court of Federal Claims.
J.D., Duke University Law School; B.A., Dartmouth College. The author wishes to
thank Professors Walter Dellinger and William Van Alstyne for their helpful
suggestions. The author would also like to thank his parents for their love and support
1. 117S. Ct 2365 (1997).
2. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct 1114,1129 (1996).
3. 65 US. 66 (1860).
4 See id at 107-08. For the Supreme Courts later repudiation of Dennison, see Puerto
Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 227 (1987) (overruling Dennison); FERC v. Mississippi,
456 U.S. 742,761 (1982) ("this rigid and isolated statement from Kentucky v. Dennison-
which suggests that the States and the Federal Government in all circumstances must
be viewed as coequal sovereigns-is not representative of the law today."); see also
Printz, 117 S. Ct at 2400 n. 30 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing Dennison as "ill
starred").
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said, 'OK."'" Although the Printz decision was more complex
than this exchange, there is much truth to the description. New
York v. United States,6 the recent precedent in which the
Supreme Court held a federal statute unconstitutional on Tenth
Amendment grounds,7 involved the commandeering of the
state's legislature.8 Printz involved the commandeering of a
local sheriff,9 and the Court saw no distinction between the two
cases.10 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, held that Congress
may not command a state's officers to administer a federal
regulatory program."
In Dennison,12 the Supreme Court interpreted the Extradition
Clause13 to create a duty for the state executive to deliver
fugitives on proper demand, and at the same time held that the
federal courts could not require performance of this duty.14
Chief Justice Taney declared unequivocally that "the Federal
Government, under the Constitution, has no power to impose
on a State officer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him
to perform it."15 This rule was the high water mark of structural
federalism, but it fell into decline within fifteen years of being
decided.16 And over 125 years later, in Puerto Rico v. Branstad,17
the Supreme Court dealt the Dennison rule its death blow,
5. Conversation with Professor Dellinger, Spring 1998.
6. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
7. See ia at 177 ("Whether one views the take title provision as lying outside
Congress' enumerated powers, or as infringing upon the core of state sovereignty
reserved by the Tenth Amendment, the provision is inconsistent with the Federal
structure of our Government established by the Constitution.").
8. See ia at 176 ("[t]he act commandeers the legislative processes of the States by
directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program") (citations
omitted).
9. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2369.
10. See ia at 2383 ("We adhere to that principle [of dual sovereignty] today, and
conclude categorically, as we concluded categorically in New York 'The Federal
Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory
program.") (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 188).
11. Seeid at2384.
12 65 US. 66 (1860).
13. U.S. CONSr. art IV, §Z
14. See Dennison, 65 U.S. at 107-09.
15. Id. at 107.
16. See Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 531,541 (1876) (stating that
"when a plain official duty, requiring no exercise of discretion, is to be performed, and
performance is refused, any person who will sustain personal injury by such refusal
may have a mandamus to compel its performance," even if the order is sought in
federal court against a state officer).
17. 483 U.S. 219 (1987).
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announcing that the rule "rests upon a foundation with which
time and the currents of constitutional change have dealt much
less favorably [than the Dennison Court's Extradition Clause
interpretation]. If [the rule] seemed clear to the Court in 1861,
facing the looming shadow of a Civil War . . . basic
constitutional principles now point as dearly the other way." 8
The Branstad Court continued, "[tlhe fundamental premise of
the holding in Dennison-'that the States and the Federal
Government in all circumstances must be viewed as coequal
sovereign-is not representative of the law today." 9
Printz suggests that Dennison may not only have withstood
the "currents of constitutional change,"' but that, as a practical
matter, Dennison is quite representative of current law, having
the potential to overturn the administration of numerous
federal statutes.20  The Printz holding prohibiting the
commandeering of state officers announced a bright line rule
under the constitutional requirement of "dual sovereignty."2'
In light of this rule, Justice Scalia compared the status of any
statute jeopardized thereby with that of the statutes at issue in
INS v. Chadha,22 "in which the legislative veto, though
enshrined in perhaps hundreds of federal statutes, most of
which were enacted in the 1970s and the earliest of which was
enacted in 1932... was nonetheless held unconstitutional."23
The Printz majority discarded any possibility of balancing tests
18. Id. at 227.
19. Id. at 228 (citing FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742,761 (1982)).
20. Justice O'Connor concurred with the Printz majority with the caveat that the
Court was not deciding the constitutionality of "purely ministerial reporting
requirements." Printz, 117 S. Ct at 2385 (O'onnor, J., concurring). However, such
reporting requirements still seem to necessitate the commandeering of state executive
officers, and the Printz opinion declares that no balancing tests are permissible. See id. at
2384; see also id. at 2383 n.17 ("The Brady Act does not merely require CLEOs [chief law
enforcement officers] to report information in their private possession. It requires them
to report information that belongs to them in their official capacity .... In other words,
the suggestion that extension of this statute to private citizens would eliminate the
constitutional problem posits the impossible."). For examples of statutes which Printz
may jeopardize, see Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordlnacy: May Congress
Commandeer State Oicers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L REV. 1001, 1003, rL3
(1995).
21. Printz, 117 S. Ct at 2384 ("such commands are fundamentally incompatible with
our constitutional system of dual sovereignty"); see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S.
452, 457-58 (1991) (stating that the constitutional structure requires joint sovereignty
between the federal government and the states).
22. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
23. Printz, 117S. Ct. at 2376.
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or case-by-case analysis. 24 The Court also rejected, afortiori, any
distinction between policymaking and ministerial functions by
state officials-thus making the ruling an anti-functionalist
one.2
The foundation of the Printz decision is a belief in the
inviolability of state sovereignty. Contrary to one recent
commentary, Printz need not raise any questions about the
continued role of cooperative federalism. 26 Nor, as Professor
Vicki Jackson suggests, is the Printz variety of federalism
potentially unworkable.27 States would continue to enforce
federal regulatory programs whenever they consented to
cooperate, which is their constitutional prerogative. Any
changes in cooperation between federal and state governments
would be based on local politics. Although Dennison is never
mentioned by the majority, this article will show how the
structuralist reasoning in Printz is neither dictum nor a
departure from the Constitution, and that Printz necessarily
requires the overturning of all federal statutes violative of the
Dennison rule. The few exceptions are those statutes that are
enacted as a direct implementation of constitutional clauses
that expressly require-or expressly authorize Congress to
24. See id. at 2384 ("The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring
the States to address particular problems, nor command the States' officers, or those of
their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program. It
matters not whether policymaking is involved, and no case-by-case weighing of the
burdens or benefits is necessary; such commands are fundamentally incompatible with
our constitutional system of dual sovereignty.").
25. See id. at 2381 (suggesting the legal standard proposed by the Federal
government-distinguishing policymaking functions from ministerial functions-
would create a line as nebulous as the one which divides constitutional from
unconstitutional delegations of power, and concluding that "[e]ven assuming,
moreoever, that the Brady Act leaves no 'policymaking' discretion with the states, we
fail to see how that improves rather than worsens the intrusion upon state
sovereignty"). The Court was even more dismissive of the dissents suggestion that the
Brady Act escaped the New York holding because it was directed to individuals, rather
than states. See id. at 2382 ("To say that the Federal Government cannot control the
state, but can control all of its officers, is to say nothing of significance.").
26. See Note, Federalism-Compelling State Officials to Enforce Federal Regulatory
Regimes, 111 HARV. L. REV. 207, 217 (1997) ("Despite its invocation of a 'categorical'
rule, Printz raised more questions than it answered and burdened Congress and the
courts with the task of deciding what role, if any, the notion of cooperative federalism
can continue to play in the constitutional structure.").
27. See Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and
Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2182 (1998) ("Printz v. United States appears to offer a
relatively clear line that Congress may not transgress-requiring (rather than inducing)
state officials to be the enforcement agents of federal laws. This line, although offering
some benefits of clarity, is not well grounded in history and does not necessarily inhere
in the pragmatics of a workable federalism.").
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require-affirmative state action.28 The result is a federal system
in which state and federal governments are confined to their
proper spheres.29
FACTS
In 1993, Congress amended the Gun Control Act of 196830
(hereinafter "GCA") by passage of the Brady Act, which
required the Attorney General to establish a national instant
background check system for gun purchasers by November 30,
1998.31 Interim provisions required the firearms dealer to
gather certain information about purchasers and provide it to
the chief law enforcement officer (hereinafter "CLEO") of the
purchaser's residence?= Subject to a few exceptions, the
firearms dealer was then required to wait five business days
before selling the handgun, unless the CLEO notified the dealer
that the CLEO had no reason to believe the transfer would be
illegal?3
A dealer was permitted to sell a gun immediately if the
purchaser had a state handgun permit issued after a
background checkP4 or if state law provided for a background
check.3 However, if a state did not provide for either of these
alternatives, whenever a CLEO was notified of a proposed
transfer, the CLEO would have to "make a reasonable effort" to
determine within five business days whether the transfer
would violate federal, state, or local law.36 This "reasonable
effort" would include "research in whatever state and local
28. An example of such a clause would be the Extradition Clause, US. CONST. art.
IV, § 2. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2371-72, 2372 rL3. According to the Extradition Clause:
A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall
flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the
executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be
removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.
For other examples, see Caminker, supra note 20, at 1031.
29. The benefits of a dual sovereignty system are a matter of contention. See, e.g.,
Jackson, supra note 27, at 2196; Deborah Jones Merritt, Three Faces ofFederalism: Finding
a Formulafor the Future, 47 VAND. L REv. 1563,1564-66 (1994).
30. 18 US.C. § 921-28 (1994).
31. Pub.L. No. 103-159, as amended by Pub.L. 103-322,103 Stat 2074, note following
18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994).
32 See18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1)(A)(i)(I)-(V) (1994).
33. See id. § 922(s)(1)(A)(ii).
34. See id. § 922(s)(1)(C).
35. See Ed. § 922(s)(1)(D).
36. Id.§922(s)(2).
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recordkeeping systems are available and in a national system
designated by the Attorney General."37 Although the Brady Act
did not require the CLEO to take any action if the transfer was
unlawful, if the CLEO did notify the firearms dealer, he was
required to provide the purchaser with a written statement of
the reasons for the purchaser's ineligibility if requested to do
so. Furthermore, the CLEO was required to destroy all
records in his possession relating to the transfer if no basis for
rejecting the sale was discovered.3 9 The GCA also stated that
any person who "knowingly violates [the section of the GCA
amended by the Brady Act] shall be fined under this title,
imprisoned for no more than a year, or both."40
Two CLEO's-Jay Printz of Ravalli County, Montana, and
Richard Mack of Graham County, Arizona-separately
challenged the interim provisions as unconstitutional. 41 In each
case, the district courts held the interim provisions
unconstitutional, but severed them from the rest of the
statute.42 The Ninth Circuit consolidated the cases and reversed
both decisions, upholding all of the interim provisions.43 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Ninth
Circuit.44
ANALYSIS
Justice Scalia began the majority opinion in Printz with the
following comment: "Because there is no constitutional text
speaking to this precise question, the answer to the CLEO's
challenge must be sought in historical understanding and
practice, in the structure of the Constitution, and in the
jurisprudence of this Court."45 This language is unusual, not
because such an absence of text is uncommon in constitutional
jurisprudence, but because the Court's final conclusion is so
37. Id.
38. See id. § 922(s)(6)(C).
39. See id § 922 (s)(6)(B)(i).
40. Id. §924(a)(5).
41. See Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372, 1375 (D. Aria. 1994); Printz v.
United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503,1510-11 (D. Mont 1994).
42. See Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1373; Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1519-20.
43. See Printz v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025 (1995).
44. See Printz, 117 S. Ct at 2365.
45. Id. at 2370.
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uncompromisingly formalist.46 In order to determine which
arguments actually drive the majority opinion, it is helpful to
start with the Court's conclusion and work backwards to find
premises that require a bright line test. The Printz Court sets
forth the following rule:
The Federal Government may neither issue directives
requiring States to address particular problems, nor
command the States' officers, or those of their political
subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory
program. It matters not whether policymaking is involved,
and no case-by-case weighing of the burdens or benefits is
necessary; such commands are fundamentally incompatible
with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty.47
Justice Scalia looked to three sources for this decision. 48 Of
these three lines of analysis, two of them-historical
understanding and practice, and constitutional jurisprudence-
are at best supportive of a bright line rule. As will be shown
below, neither argument standing alone is strong enough to
justify the majority holding. However, the Printz decision is
absolutely required by Justice Scalia's structural analysis, and
thus it is the structural analysis that decides the case.
A. Historical Understanding and Practice
A comparison of the majority and dissenting opinions shows
much ambiguity in the historical understanding, an
understanding which the Court admits was not dispositive.49
Justice Scalia relied on early congressional enactments and
the statements of the Framers for evidence that Congress may
not commandeer state officers.m The majority's belief in the
importance of state sovereignty colors this analysis, however,
because the Printz Court placed the burden on the government
to show at least some evidence that the Founders did not
believe state consent to be necessary when state officers
administered federal programs under early enactments.51
46. See id at 2383 (citing New York in defense of apparently formalistic results where
the "form of our government" is at stake) (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 187). See infra.
47. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2384.
48. See id. at2370.
49. See id at 2376 ("The constitutional practice we have examined above tends to
negate the existence of the congressional power asserted here, but is not conclusive.").
50. See id. at 2369-76.
51. See id. at 2372 ("But none of these statements necessarily implies-what is the
No. 1]
Harvard Journal ofLaw & Public Policy
In response to the government's argument that the
commandeering of state officers was required by the earliest
Congresses,5 2 which implies that the Constitution permitted
such practices, Justice Scalia noted that such enactments
"'provide contemporaneous and weighty evidence' of the
Constitution's meaning,"53 but added that "[c]onversely if, as
petitioners contend, earlier Congresses avoided use of this
highly attractive power, we would have reason to believe that
the power was thought not to exist." 4 This response was
vehemently objected to by Justice Stevens, however, on the
theory that such a principle would have undermined many of
the New Deal statutes.5 5 In addition, pre-ratification history is
much more compelling than post-ratification history.
Even if the Court's early enactments test was uncontested,
however, the relevant enactments may be seen either as a
consistent avoidance of Congress's coercion of the participation
of state officials or, alternatively, as a frequent use of the
practice, depending upon how the terms are defined.
The majority defined the use of state officials as not
including the commandeering of state judiciaries in enforcing
federal law.56 Thus, the use of state judges for enforcement of
federal law, a prevalent early practice, is discarded as
irrelevant to the question of state sovereignty because the
Madisonian Compromise5 7 the Supremacy Clause,5 8 and the
critical point here-that Congress could impose these responsibilities without the
consent of the states.").
52. See Brief for United States, 28 (claiming that "the earliest Congresses enacted
statutes that required the participation of state officials in the implementation of federal
laws."); Print, 117 S. Ct. at 2370 (citing naturalization statutes which required state
court participation, e.g. Act of Mar. 26,1790, ch. 3, §1,1 Stat. 103; Act of July 20,1790,
ch. 29, §3, 1 Stat. 132 (statute which required state courts to "resolv[e] controversies
between a captain and the crew of his ship concerning the seaworthiness of the
vessel"); Act of Feb. 12,1793, ch. 7, §3,1 Stat. 302-05 (to hear "claims of slave owners
who had apprehended Fugitive slaves"); Act of Apr. 7,1798, ch. 26, §3, 1 Stat. 548 (to
take "proof of the claims of Canadian refugees who had assisted the United States
during the Revolutionary War"); and Act of July 6,1798, ch. 66, §2, 1 Stat. 577-78 (to
require "deportation of alien enemies... in times of war")).
53. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2370 (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723-24 (1986)
(quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 US. 783,790 (1983))).
54 Id.
55. See id. at 2391 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
56. See id. at2371.
57. US. CONST. art. Ill, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested
in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish."). See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2371 ("These early laws establish, at
most, that the Constitution was originally understood to permit imposition of an
obligation on state judges to enforce federal prescriptions, insofar as those prescriptions
[Vol. 22254
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Full Faith and Credit Clause 9 show that courts were
necessarily viewed as distinct from the executive and
legislative branches for sovereignty purposes. 60 Taking this
logic a step further, Justice Scalia argued that the
numerousness of statutes requiring enforcement by the
judiciary, contemporaneous with an utter absence of
commandeered executive officers, suggests that early
Congresses believed that they did not have the power to
commandeer non-judicial state officers.61  Under similar
reasoning, the majority discarded the Extradition Act of 1793 as
evidence of early commandeering because it directly
implemented the Extradition Clause.62
However, in dissent, Justice Stevens provided common sense
reasons why a lack of such early statutes did not indicate a lack
of power to enact them-for instance, it was more convenient
and politic to have the States' consent 63 Moreover, Justice
Stevens noted that the use of state courts was not merely a
judicial function falling under the Supremacy Clause, but also
included a number of executive functions regularly performed
by state judges.64 To the extent courts were considered
related to matters appropriate for the judicial power," and suggesting this conclusion is
implied by the Madisonian Compromise because it "established only a Supreme Court,
and made the creation of lower federal courts optional with the Congress-even
though it was obvious that the Supreme Court alone could not hear all federal cases
throughout the United States") (citing C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION
325-27 (1928)).
58. US. CONST. art VI, c12 ("the Laws of the United States... shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby.").
59. US. CoNsr. art IV, § 1 (requiring state judges to enforce obligations arising in
other states).
60. See Printz, 117 S. Ct at 2371.
61. See id ("Indeed, it can be argued that the numerousness of these statutes,
contrasted with the utter lack of statutes imposing obligations on the States' executive
(notwithstanding the attractiveness of that course to Congress), suggests an assumed
absence of such power.").
62 See id. at 2371-72; see also supra note 28 (mentioning the Extradition Clause as an
instance in which the Constitution allows the federal government to require specific
action on the part of the states).
63. See id. at 2393 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Thus, for example, the decision by
Congress to give President Wilson the authority to utilize the services of state officers
in implementing the World War I draft surely indicates that the national legislature
saw no constitutional impediment to the enlistment of state assistance during a federal
emergency. The fact that the president was able to implement the program by
respectfully 'request[ing]' state action, rather than bluntly commanding it is evidence
that he was an effective statesman, but surely does not indicate that he doubted either
his or Congress' power to use mandatory language if necessary.") (citations omitted).
64. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2391-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (giving examples of state
court responsibilities to consider applications for citizenship, register aliens seeking
naturalization, and certify the seaworthiness of vessels).
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distinctive from other branches of state government, the use of
courts in non-judicial, executive capacities suggests that early
Congresses may have thought the state executive branch was
subject to federal regulation.6 5
Even if the majority's historical argument is not a clear
winner as to the interpretation of early congressional
enactments, it successfully casts doubt upon Justice Stevens's
view that early enactments prove the Constitution did allow for
required participation of state officials.
In addition, there was also contention over Alexander
Hamilton's viewpoint, expressed in The Federalist No. 27, to
which Justice Souter, dissenting, devoted nearly all of his
discussion.66 After explaining that the federal government
could "employ the ordinary magistracy of each [State] in the
execution of its laws," 67 Hamilton continued as follows:
[t]hus the Legislatures, Courts, and Magistrates of the
respective members will be incorporated into the operations
of the national government, as far as its just and constitutional
authority extends; and it will be rendered auxiliary to the
enforcement of its laws.68
For Justice Souter, this language dearly permitted the
commandeering of a state executive because "the state
governmental machinery 'will be incorporated' into the
Nation's operation, and because the 'auxiliary' status of the
state officials will occur because they are 'bound by the sanctity
of an oath."' 69
Justice Scalia detected two flaws in this interpretation. First,
because of the oath to observe the laws of the United States,
Justice Souter's view would affirmatively require state officers
to take a role in implementing federal law absent any
congressional directive.70 Second, it would require the state
65. See id. at 2391 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Mhe fact that Congress did elect to rely
on state judges and the clerks of state courts to perform a variety of executive functions
is surely evidence of a contemporary understanding that their status as state officials
did not immunize them from federal service.")(citations omitted).
66. See id at 2401-04 (Souter, J., dissenting).
67. THE FEDERALIST No. 27,176 (Alexander Hamilton) (C. Rossiter, ed., 1961).
68. Id. at 177 (emphasis in original).
69. Printz, 117 S.Ct at 2402 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Hamilton, supra note 67, at
175).
70. See id. at 2373.
[Vol. 22256
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legislature to follow federal directives 1 Justice Scalia readily
dismissed the first result as unthinkable 2 For the second, he
looked to the recent New York decision prohibiting the
commandeering of state legislatures as a refutation of the
dissent's interpretation of The Federalist No. 27.73 As Justice
Stevens noted, however, New York did not discuss The Federalist
No. 27 and therefore should not be persuasive as to the bearing
of The Federalist No. 27 on state courts.74 If state courts were
expected to assume executive responsibilities, as Justice
Stevens argues, the New York opinion would not necessarily
refute Hamilton's view of the use of state executive officials,
but only legislative officials.75
Justice Scalia proposed a different interpretation of The
Federalist No. 27, claiming that it refers to the duty of state
officers not to obstruct federal law in the enforcement of state
law.76 This theory fits squarely within both the New York
decision and The Federalist No. 36, which called for paying
states whenever their officials are employed by the federal
goverrm ent 7 The potential weakness in this interpretation, as
pointed out by Justice Souter, is that it ignores the
incorporation language contained in The Federalist No. 27.78
71. See id.
72 Compare id. ("But no one has ever thought, and no one asserts in the present
litigation, that that is the law.") with infra note 137.
73. See id. at 2373 ("The second problem with Justice Souter's reading is that it makes
state legislatures subject to federal direction .... We have held, however, that state
legislatures are not subject to federal direction.") (citing New York v. United States, 505
US. 144 (1992)).
74 See id. at 2391 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("But since the New York opinion did not
mention Federalist 27, it does not affect either the relevance or the weight of the
historical evidence provided by No. 27 insofar as it relates to state courts and
magistrates.").
75. New York might, however, render Justice Souter's interpretation less persuasive,
because the same logic applied to state legislatures as executives in The Federalist No.
27. Indeed, it appears that The Federalist No. 27 necessarily implicates state legislatures
under Justice Souter's reading. See Printz, 117 S.Ct at 2373 nr5. If true, and if The
Federalist No. 27 is as decisive as Justice Souter believes it to be, then New York might
have to be overturned-a position which Justice Souter did not take. See i& at 2401
(Souter, J., dissenting).
76. See id at 2374 (suggesting The Federalist No. 27 be "taken to refer to nothing
more (or less) than the duty owed to the National Government, on the part of all state
officials, to enact, enforce, and interpret state law in such fashion as not to obstruct the
operation of federal law, and the attendant reality that all state actions constituting
such obstruction, even legislative acts, are ipso facto invalid.").
77. See id. (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 36, at 222 (Alexander Hamilton) (C. Rossiter,
ed., 1961)).
78. See id. at 2402 n.1 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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The historical background is thus far from transparent.79
Moreover, the correctness of Justice O'Connor's historical
analysis in New York-an important precedent for the majority-
has been questioned as a basis for the principle that state
legislatures may not be commandeered by Congress. 0 It has
also been argued that although Justice O'Connor was accurate
in her view that the Framers frowned upon the
commandeering of state legislatures, Justice Stevens' dissent in
New York was correct in saying that the Framers did intend the
commandeering of state executive officers8
It should suffice to note that the Printz majority itself
declared that its historical analysis was "not conclusive"
enough for the Court to "negate the existence of the
congressional power asserted here."82 The apparent purpose of
the historical section of the Court's opinion, therefore, is to
discredit the dissenting views of the early congressional
history.
B. Structural Analysis
The bright-line structural analysis relied upon by Justice
Scalia represents a potential watershed in the jurisprudence of
federalism. It is the only argument used by the majority which
all three dissenting Justices leave untouched, except for Justice
Stevens' broad, unsubstantiated claim that there is not "a
clause, sentence, or paragraph in the entire text of the
Constitution" to support the majority holding.83 There is no
direct counter-argument offered to suggest how the majority
misapprehended the nature of state sovereignty as required by
the "essential postulates" of the Constitution's structure.84
79. See id. at 2402 (Souter, J., dissenting) (ustice Souter, whose dissent is based on a
historical analysis, declared that his decision was "closer than I anticipated.").
80. See, e.g., II Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L
REV. 633, 681-89 (1993); Martin IL Redish, Doing it with Mirrors: New York v. United
States and Constitutional Limitations on Federal Power to Require State Legislation, 21
HASTINGS CONST. LQ. 593,595-603 (1994).
81. See Saikrishna B. Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L REV. 1957,1990-2032
(1993).
82 Printz, 117 S.Ct at 2376 ("The constitutional practice we have examined above
tends to negate the existence of the congressional power asserted here, but it is not
conclusive.").
83. Id. at 2389 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 2376 ("We turn next to consideration of the structure of the Constitution, to
see if we can discern among its 'essential postulates' a principle that controls the
present cases.") (citing Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313,322 (1934)).
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Instead, the dissenting justices are concerned about the
functional effects of recognizing state sovereignty as a
protection against federal commandeering,85 the power of the
Necessary and Proper Clause to overcome state sovereignty,8 6
and the historical intent of the Founders. 7 In the end, Justice
Scalia's structural consideration of the Constitution's text is
never questioned in textual terms.
The first premise of Justice Scalia's argument is that "the
Constitution established a system of 'dual sovereignty."'88 As
Justice Scalia noted, this is "incontestible."8 9 In support, James
Madison is quoted for the established proposition that
"[a]lthough the States surrendered many of their powers to the
Federal Government, they retained a 'residuary and inviolable
sovereignty."' 90 Justice Scalia then proceeded to show how the
Constitution's text reflects the existence of this state
sovereignty, and in support cited the following examples of
clauses from the Constitution: the prohibition on involuntary
reduction of a state's territory;91 the Judicial Power Clause92
and the Privileges and Immunities ClauseP both of which refer
to citizens of states; the amendment provision requiring state
85. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2394 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the structural
arguments are insufficient to rebut a presumption based upon Justice Stevens'
historical understanding); see id at 2395 (discussing the needs of Our Federalism and
its protection for state sovereignty).
86. See Id. at 2387 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (applying the Necessary and Proper Clause
as a source of support for "temporary enlistment of local police officers").
87. See id. at 2389-94 (historical analysis suggesting the Framers did intend the
commandeering of state officers).
88. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2376 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,457 (1991); see
also Tafflin v. Lefitt, 493 U.S. 455,458 (1990).
89. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2376.
90. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (C. Rossiter, ed.,
1961)).
91. U.S. CoNsr. art. TV, § 3 ("New States may be admitted by the Congress into this
Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other
State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States,
without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the
Congress.").
92. U.S. CONSr. art. Il, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend... to Controversies
between two or more States-between a State and citizens of another State;-between
citizens of different States; -between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citiznes thereof, and foreign
States, Citizens, or subjects."). The final phrase, however, was changed by the Eleventh
Amendment.
93. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 2 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.").
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ratification;94 and the Guarantee Clause,95 which the Court had
previously held "presupposes the continued existence of the
states and... those means and instrumentalities which are the
creation of their sovereign and vested rights."96
It is in this fashion that a Constitution that contains "no ..
* text speaking to this precise question"97 can nonetheless
provide substantial text that presupposes inviolable state
sovereignty.98 This argument is the crux of the structural
analysis. By implication, because states are sovereign over their
own executive officers, any federal commandeering would
violate state sovereignty. The state governments are thus
formally treated as separate spheres.99 In spirit, the reasoning is
reminiscent of Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Dennison, which
suggested that any compulsion of state officers to enforce
federal law would have to destroy state sovereignty.100
The Printz Court also considered the Tenth Amendment an
explicit recognition that Congress does not have all
governmental powers, "but only discrete, enumerated ones"
under Article L § 8-a limitation which justice Scalia argued is
implied by the original text alone.'0 The Court's logic is thus
truly based on the Constitution's structure, as opposed to the
idea that any one textual clause precludes federal
encroachment. The Printz opinion limited its use of the Tenth
Amendment to evidence that an inviolable residual state
94. US. CONsT. art V ("The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall
deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the
Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a
Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all
Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of
three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof....").
95. US. CONST. art IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government and shall protect each of them against
Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the
Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.").
96. Printz, 117 S. Ct at 2376 (quoting Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 at 414-15
(1938)).
97. Id. at 2370.
98. This is not, however, an "expresio unius" theory. See infra note 166.
99. Compare Printz, 117 S. Ct at 2378 ("This separation of the two spheres is one of
the Constitution's structural protections of liberty."), with infra notes 104,108 (giving a
functionalist explanation of this separation).
100. See Dennison, 65 US. at 107 ("Indeed, such a power would place every state
under the control and dominion of the General Government, even in the administration
of its internal concerns and reserved rights.").
101. See Printz, 117 S. Ct at2376.
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sovereignty exists.102 Justice Thomas' concurrence reads the
Court's opinion to hold the Brady Act in violation of the Tenth
Amendment 0 3 but Justice Scalia's argument may be read even
more broadly-residual state sovereignty would have been
violated by the Brady Act even before the Bill of Rights was
ratified.104
Further, the Printz concept of dual sovereignty under the
structure of the Constitution was based on the understanding
of Madison and Hamilton, as understood in New York 05 As
noted by the Court, James Madison declared that for the central
government to make "laws, with coercive sanctions, for the
States as political bodies," had been "exploded on all hands,"
and that as a result, it was decided that the states and central
government would exercise concurrent authority over the
people.10 6 Alexander Hamilton similarly announced that the
people were "the only proper objects of government." 07 For the
majority, these remarks indicated a founding view of the
constitutional text similar to their own, not a founding vision of
government policy. The historical evidence was not used by the
Court to suggest how the Framers desired federalism to
function, but rather the Framers' understanding of the textual
choice they made when the Constitution was ratified to
"regulate individuals, not states."'0 8
102. See id. at 2376-77 ("Residual state sovereignty was also implicit of course, in the
Constitution's conferral upon Congress of not all governmental powers, but only
discrete, enumerated ones, art. I § 8, which implication was rendered express by the
Tenth Amendment's assertion that '[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively-"').
103. See id. at 2385 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The Court properly holds today that
the Brady Act violates the Tenth Amendment...
104. See id. at 2379 r13 (In response to the dissenting argument under the Necessary
and Proper Clause, Justice Scalia explained. "This argument ... falsely presumes that
the Tenth Amendment is the exclusive textual source of protection for principles of
federalism. Our system of dual sovereignty is reflected in numerous constitutional
provisions ... and not only those, like the Tenth Amendment, that speak to the point
exactly.")
105. See id at 2377. ("We have set forth the historical record in more detail
elsewhere.") (citing New York, 505 US. at 161-66).
106. See Priniz, 117 S. Ct at 2377 (quoting 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787,9 (M. Farrand ed.1911)).
107. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2377 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 109 (Alexander
Hamilton)(C. Rossiter, ed. 1961)).
108. See Printz, 117 S. Ct at 2377 ("The Framers explicitly chose a Constitution that
confers upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not states.") (quoting New
York, 505 US. at 166). For a different perspective, see Jackson, supra note 27, at 2195-96
(arguing that Justice Scalia fails to differentiate between the action of the whole on the
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The Printz Court also applied functionalist reasoning, but as a
defense of formalism. Justice Scalia recognized federalism as a
separation of powers issue between sovereign states and a
sovereign national government 09 but he also considered the
effects of the separation of separate spheres of state and federal
governments. Justice Scalia discussed the advantages of a
system in which the two sovereignties protect liberty, with both
levels of government accountable to their respective citizens."10
He concluded, "[t]he power of the Federal Government would
be augmented immeasurably if it were able to impress into its
service-and at no cost to itself-the police officers of the 50
states."" Yet these were not simply Justice Scalia's policy
judgments-the separation of powers discussion is amply
supported by the intent of the Founders and the Court's prior
jurisprudence." 2
In addition, the Court made the more novel functionalist
argument that federal control of state officers would encroach
upon the balance between Congress and the Executive
Branch."13 The Framers were dear that there was to be unity in
the Executive Branch." 4 As the majority explained, "[t]hat
unity would be shattered, and the power of the President
would be subject to reduction, if Congress could act as
effectively without the President as with him, by simply
part and the part on the whole, because Congress represents the states through its
citizens).
109. See Printz, 117 S. Ct at 2378.
110. See id. at 2377-78.
111. Id. at 2378.
112 See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 ("Just as the separation and independence of the
coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of
excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and
the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.");
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323 (James Madison)(C. Rossiter, ed., 1961) ("[T]he power
surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then
the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments.
Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments
will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself."); see also
THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 180-81 (Alexander Hamilton)(C. Rossiter, ed.,
1961)(discussing how the general and state governments can be used by the people as
checks against each other).
113. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2378.
114 See THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (A. Hamilton); Statement of James Wilson in 2
DOcumENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 495 (M. Jensen
ed.1976). See also Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE LJ. 541, 568-99 (1994)(arguing that the Constitution's
structure, when properly read, vests a unitary executive power solely and exclusively
in the hands of the President).
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requiring state officers to execute its laws."" 5 Insofar as state
officers could be commandeered to execute the laws, the
constitutional guarantee of the President's power to faithfully
execute the laws would be effectively decreased." 6
Justice Stevens, in contrast, framed the question of state
sovereignty in terms of the structure of the federal government-
because the federal government was structured to represent
states, concerns about federalism should be limited." 7 This
argument presupposed that the issue in Printz was how much
of a burden a statute may impose on state sovereignty, which
was indeed the issue in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authorityi"s However, the issue in Printz was not the
importance of protecting the role of state sovereignty, but the
existence of the sovereignty itself. As Justice Scalia explained,
the object of the federal law was to infringe on state
sovereignty." 9 This implicates the structure of the Constitution;
at stake is not a burden on state sovereignty, but the authority
to impose the particular type of burden.
The dissenting Justices' apparent answer to the majority's
textual analysis of governmental structure was an application
of the Necessary and Proper Clause as a source of
commandeering power. 20 But this dissenting view did not
address the majority's structural analysis. Justice Scalia did not
rely upon the functional arguments in support of inviolable
115. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2378.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 2394 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Given the fact that the Members of
Congress are elected by the people of the several States, with each State receiving an
equal number of Senators in order to ensure that even the smallest States have a
powerful voice in the legislature, it is quite unrealistic to assume that they will ignore
the sovereignty concerns of their constituents.").
118. 469 US. 528 (1985). In fact, this distinction has already arisen in the Fourth
Circuit when it was faced with a claim that Printz should be applied to a generally
applicable law. See West v. Anne Arundel County, Md., 137 F.3d 752, 759-60 (4th Cir.
1998) (declining to overrule Garcia, and noting the exception in Printz for generally
applicable laws that affect state sovereignty).
119. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2383 ("But where, as here, it is the whole object of the law
to direct the functioning of the state executive, and hence to compromise the structural
framework of dual sovereignty, such a 'balancing analysis' is inappropriate."). Justice
Scalia further declared, "[lit is the very principle of separate state sovereignty that such
a law offends, and no comparative assessment of the various interests can overcome
that fundamental defect" d
120. See id. at 2387 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Mhe additional grant of authority in
that section '[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing powers' is surely adequate to support the temporary
enlistment of local police officers....").
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residual state sovereignty. Instead, he looked to the mandate
against commandeering that the Court had already determined
from the structure of the Constitution.21
The majority explained that the Necessary and Proper Clause
addressed what might follow from the sovereignty declared by
the Constitution, but it did not address the sovereignty itself.22
Ironically, Justice Scalia used the Necessary and Proper Clause
itself for support. His argument is striking and bears repetition:
What destroys the dissent's Necessary and Proper Clause
argument, however, is not the Tenth Amendment but the
Necessary and Proper Clause itself. When a "La[w] ... for
carrying into Execution" the Commerce Clause violates the
principle of state sovereignty reflected in the various
constitutional provisions we mentioned earlier.., it is not a
"La[w] ... proper for carrying into Execution the Commerce
Clause," and is thus, in the words of the Federalist, "merely
[an] ac[t] of usurpation" which "deserves to be treated as
such."123
This language differs from the New York decision, which the
Printz Court quoted to support the above proposition, in that it
expressly uses the Necessary and Proper clause itself as a
limitation on Congress's power. This principle of a limiting
Necessary and Proper Clause is developed in an article by
Professor Gary Lawson and Patricia Granger cited by the
Court. Lawson and Granger argued that the term "proper" was
used during the time of the Framers to indicate a law "that is
within the peculiar jurisdiction or responsibility of the relevant
governmental actor."24 The test in the federalism context is
whether or not a law is improperly regulating unenumerated
areas, even if it will make exercise of an enumerated power
more efficient.2 s Significantly, Lawson and Granger state that
although "freestanding conceptions of state sovereignty" may
have been inappropriate measures under the Commerce
121. This reliance on structure in response to the dissent suggests that the majority's
functional arguments may have been unnecessary to the decision.
122. See Printz, 117 S. Ct at 2379 (The Court looked to a similar analysis which it had
applied in New York-"'The Commerce Clause, for example, authorizes Congress to
regulate interstate commerce directly; it does not authorize Congress to regulate state
governments' regulation of interstate commerce.") (quoting New York, 505 US. at 166).
123. Printz, 117 S. Ct at 2379.
124. Gary Lawson and Patricia Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A
Jurisdictional Interpretation ofthe Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267,291 (1993).
125. See id. at331.
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Clause,126 the Court might have a duty to apply them under the
Necessary and Proper Clause. 27
Thus, the Court held that the Necessary and Proper Clause
does not address the existence of an inviolable state
sovereignty. 28 Instead, the Necessary and Proper Clause
dictates that if such a sovereignty exists, Congress may never
pass a law reducing that sovereignty. 29
Although this is a groundbreaking holding under the
Necessary and Proper Clause, it is not "directly contradicted"
by McCulloch v. Maryland,130 as claimed by Justice Stevens.' 3'
The majority did not directly address Justice Stevens'
argument, but the dissent overstated the requirements of
McCulloch. In footnote two, Justice Stevens described Chief
Justice Marshall as "explaining that 'the only possible effect' of
the use of the term 'proper' was 'to present to the mind the idea
of some choice of means of legislation not straitened and
compressed within... narrow limits."132 In fact, Chief Justice
Marshall never fully defined the term "proper" in his
opinion,133 and the paragraph from which Justice Stevens
quoted suggests room for a jurisdictional, limiting
understanding of the word. The actual language in McCulloch is
as follows:
In ascertaining the sense in which the word "necessary" is
used in this clause of the constitution, we may derive some
aid from that with which it is associated. Congress shall
126. See Garcia, 469 US. at 550.
127. See Lawson and Granger, supra note 124, at 332-33.
128. See Printz, 117 S. Ct at 2379 (denying the dissent's reasoning that the Commerce
Clause aided by the Necessary and Proper Clause "establishes the Brady Act's
constitutional validity, because the Tenth Amendment imposes no limitations on the
exercise of delegated powers but merely prohibits the exercise of powers 'not delegated
to the United States.") (citation omitted in original).
129. See ia ("When a 'La[w] ... for carrying into Execution' the Commerce Clause
violates the principle of state sovereignty ... it is not a 'La[w] ... proper for carrying
into Execution the Commerce Clause,' and is thus, in the words of The Federalist,
'merely [an] ac[t] of usurpation' which 'deserve[s] to be treated as such!") (quoting
THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 204 (Alexander Hamiliton) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961)).
130. 17 US. 316 (1819).
131. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2388 n2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Moreover, this reading of
the term 'proper' gives it a meaning directly contradicted by Chief Justice Marshall in
McCulloch v. Maryland.") (citations omitted).
132. Id.
133. See Lawson and Granger, supra note 124, at 271("Chief Justice Marshall's
discussion, however, focused almost exclusively on the word 'necessary,' whereas the
clause requires executory laws to be both necessary and proper.").
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have power "to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper to carry into execution" the powers of the
government. If the word "necessary" was used in that strict
and rigorous sense for which the counsel for the State of
Maryland contend, it would be an extraordinary departure
from the usual course of the human mind, as exhibited in
composition, to add a word, the only possible effect of which
is to qualify that strict and rigorous meaning; to present to
the mind the idea of some choice of means of legislation not
straitened and compressed within the narrow limits for
which gentlemen contend.1 34
Chief Justice Marshall's language explained that the word
"necessary" did not mean absolutely necessary, in the sense
that one thing could not exist without the other, because the
use of the word "proper" brings to mind a meaning of the
word "necessary" which is broad enough that it could be
narrowed in terms of what is "proper." If the word "necessary"
limited Congress to only passing laws which were
"indispensable" to the existence of a constitutionally
enumerated power, as Maryland had suggested, for the clause
to then also require the law to be "proper" would be a very
unusual choice of words. All laws indispensable to the
existence of a delegated power would, obviously, always be
proper.
It is these narrow limits, the ones for which the Maryland
"gentlemen contend,"-words omitted by Justice Stevens'
quotation'35-which the term "necessary" cannot signify. None
of the language in McCulloch prevents the word "necessary"
from being limited by the word "proper" in the sense used by
Justice Scalia.136
134. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 418-19.
135. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2388 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing McCulloch as
"explaining that'the only possible effect of the use of the term'proper' was 'to present
to the mind the idea of some choice of means of legislation not straitened and
compressed within... narrow limits.") (ellipsis in original).
136. See Lawson and Granger, supra note 124, at 289 (explaining that statutory
construction suggests the word "proper" adds meaning to the Necessary and Proper
Clause, not simply emphasis to the word "necessary"). Moreover, Justice Field, an early
supporter of the sovereignty principle announced by Dennison, goes so far as to use
McCulloch in support of the Dennison rule. Dissenting in Ex Parte Clarke, 100 US. 399,
404 (1879), Justice Field looked to the following language from Chief Justice Marshall:
"No trace is to be found in the Constitution of an intention to create a dependence of
the Federal government on the governments of the States for the execution of the great
powers assigned to it Its means are adequate to its ends; and on those means alone was
it expected to rely." See id. at 413 (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 424). Justice Field
argued that the purpose of granting Congress the "necessary" power to execute its
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Justice Stevens also responded to the majority's Necessary
and Proper Clause argument by reference to the Supremacy
Clause, which requires that "all executive and judicial officers,
both of the United States and of the several states, shall be
bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution."'3 7
He argued that this language requires state officers to follow
federal law even when federal law commandeers state
officers. 38 However, as Justice Scalia correctly noted, this
argument begs the question-because the laws under the
Supremacy Clause must be constitutional themselves, the
Supremacy Clause only permits commandeering of state
officers if such laws are already determined to be
constitutional. 3 9
If it is granted that the previously-mentioned clauses of the
Constitution 40 which presuppose state sovereignty prohibit the
commandeering of state officers, Justice Scalia's logic is
inexorable. Justice Stevens' Necessary and Proper Clause
argument is the only response made by the dissenting justices
which contends with Justice Scalia's view, and it assumes its
conclusion without even addressing the structural claim or
casting doubt on the premise that the above-mentioned clauses
presuppose a separate, inviolable sovereignty.
C. Prior Jurisprudence: An Analytical Precedent
The primary role of prior jurisprudence in Printz is to show
that once the constitutional structure has been determined,
there can be no allowance for any deviation from the
requirements of that structure. The Court's precedent may not
have recently addressed the precise issue in Printz, but it clearly
powers was to prevent the need to rely on the states, and therefore Congress must
follow any conditions states may place upon use of their agents if they are to be used.
See id. But see Jackson, supra note 27, at 2195 (suggesting that the dual sovereignty
announced by Justice Scalia "is fundamentaly at variance with principles of
constitutionalism that date at least to McCullochv. Maryland....").
137. US. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2388 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("There can be no conflict between the duties to the state and those owed to the Federal
Government because Article VI unambiguously provides that federal law 'shall be the
supreme Law of the Land,' binding in every State.").
138. See PrIntz, 117 S. Ct. at 2388 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Thus, not only the
Constitution, but every law enacted by Congress as well, establishes policy for the
States just as firmly as do laws enacted by state legislatures.").
139. See PrIntz, 117 S. Ct. at 2379 ("mhe Supremacy Clause merely brings us back to
the question discussed earlier, whether laws conscripting state officers violate state
sovereignty and are thus not in accord with the Constitution.").
140. See supra at 256.
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addressed the issue of the role structure must play in the
Court's decisionmaking process. It is adherence to this
precedent which makes Printz a truly structuralist decision.
Of the three lines of inquiry in Printz, Justice Scalia claimed to
have looked "most conclusively" to prior jurisprudence to
reach the Court's holding, 41 and, without question, the New
York case was the linchpin of this line of reasoning. 42 As the
Court noted, New York declared the following hard rule:
"Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a federal
regulatory program."143
In New York, the Court was faced with "perhaps our oldest
question of constitutional law," the division of authority
between the federal government and the states. 44 Among other
statutory provisions' 4 , the Court had to rule on the
constitutionality of a clause in the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985146, which gave states a
choice between taking title to radioactive waste generated
within their borders or becoming liable for damages resulting
from their nuclear generators. 147 Justice O'Connor, writing for
the Court, observed that in this context, inquiries into
Congress's power and inquiries into the state sovereignty
reserved by the Tenth Amendment are "mirror images of each
other."148 However, because the Tenth Amendment is a
141. Printz, 117S. Ct. at 2379.
142. See id. at 2380 ("When we were at last confronted squarely with a federal statute
that unambiguously required the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory
program, our decision should have come as no surprise) (citing New York, 505 US. 144);
see also id. at 2397 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Finally, the Court advises us that the 'prior
jurisprudence of this Court' is the most conclusive support for its position. That 'prior
jurisprudence' is New York v. United States.") (citations omitted).
143. Id. at 2380 (quoting New York, 505 US. at 188).
144. New York, 505 US. at 149.
145. See id. at 151-54 (discussing provisions for monetary incentives, see 42 US.C.
§2021 e (d)(2)(B), and access incentives, see 42 US.C. §2021 e (e)(2)(A)).
146. 42 US.C. §2021 e (d)(2)(C).
147. See id. ("If a State (or, where applicable, a compact region) in which low-level
radioactive waste is generated is unable to provide for the disposal of all such waste
generated within such State or compact region by January 1,1996, each state in which
such waste is generated, upon the request of the generator or owner of the waste, shall
take title to the waste, be obligated to take possession of the waste, and shall be liable
for all damages directly or indirectly incurred by such generator or owner as a
consequence of the failure of the State to take possession of the waste as soon after
January 1,1996, as the generator or owner notifies the State that the waste is available
for shipment").
148. New York, 505 US. at 156.
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"truism,"'149 its role is to "confir[m] that the power of the
Federal Government is subject to limits that may, in a given
instance, reserve power to the States."'1
Justice O'Connor began her analysis with the Court's
established principle that the federal government may not
commandeer the legislative processes of the states "by directly
compelling them" to enforce a regulatory program.' 5' After
citing numerous cases for the proposition that the Constitution
was adopted with the intent of preserving the states,5 2 Justice
O'Connor proceeded with a thorough analysis of the Framers'
intenti s3 The evidence produced strongly suggests that the
Framers chose to end the national government's regulation of
states then existing under the Articles of Confederation, and to
replace it with the regulation of individuals.i'
However, the reference to a prohibition on commandeered
149. See id (explaining that the Tenth Amendment "states but a truism that all is
retained which has not been surrendered") (quoting United States v. Darby, 312 US. 100(1941)).
150. Id. at 157.
151. Id. at 161 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n., Inc.,
452 US. 264,288 (1981)).
152 See id. at 162; among others, Justice O'Connor cited Lane County v. Oregon, 7
Wall. 71, 76 (1869) ("Both the States and the United States existed before the
Constitution. The people, through that instrument, established a more perfect union by
substituting a national government acting, with ample power, directly upon the
citizens, instead of the Confederate government, which acted with powers, greatly
restricted, only upon the states."), and Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725 (1869) ("[T]he
preservation of the States, and the maintenance of their governments, area as much
within the design and care of the Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the
maintenance of the National government The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks
to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.").
153. See New York, 505 US. at 163-65.
154. Justice O'Connor quoted a variety of delegates to the Constitutional Convention
from the state ratifying conventions, including the following- Oliver Ellsworth of
Connecticut, "This Constitution does not attempt to coerce sovereign bodies, states, in
their political capacity .... But this legal coercion singles out the individuaL" 2 J. Elliot,
DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTTUTION 197 (2d ed. 1863); Charles Pinckney of South
Carolina, "[T]he necessity of having a government which should at once operate upon
the people, and not upon the states, was conceived to be indispensable by every
delegation present" 4 id. at 256; Rufus King of Massachusetts, "Laws, to be effective,
therefore, must not be laid on states, but upon individuals." 2 id. at 56; Alexander
Hamilton of New York, "But can we believe that one state will ever suffer itself to be
used as an instrument of coercion? The thing is a dream; it is impossible. Then we are
brought to the dilemma-either a federal standing army is to enforce the requisitions, or
the federal treasury is to be left without supplies, and the government without support.
What sir, is the cure for this great evil? Nothing, but to enable the national laws to
operate on individuals, in the same manner as those of the states do." 2 id. at 233; and
Samuel Spencer of North Carolina, recognizing that "all the laws of the Confederation
were binding on the states in their political capacities.., but now the thing is entirely
different. The laws of Congress will be binding on individuals." 4 id. at 153.
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state enforcement of a federal regulatory program in New York
was arguably dicta.'55  Contrary to Justice Stevens' Printz
dissent, the history cited by Justice O'Connor in New York does
not suggest that the Constitution was ratified to augment the
regulation of states with regulation of individuals.156 Yet Justice
O'Connor only tangentially addressed regulation of state
executive officials, concentrating instead on regulation of state
legislatures. New York distinguished the regulation of state
courts by Congress from regulation of state legislatures, not
only by way of the Supremacy Clause, but also because "all
[such cases] involve congressional regulation of individuals,
not congressional requirements that states regulate." 57 And as
thorough as Justice O'Connor's historical analysis in New York
is, that opinion also did not rely on a text-based structural
analysis of the Constitution as Justice Scalia did in Printz.'5 8 To
the extent New York was focused on state legislatures, one could
argue that the two cases are distinguishable.
In Printz, Justice Scalia did claim that Congress may not
circumvent New York's prohibition on commandeering state
legislatures "by conscripting the State's officers directly,"159
which brings Printz within the confines of the undisputed
understanding of the New York holding. However, the Printz
opinion only mentioned this application of the New York
holding in a concluding paragraph-there is no proof offered
therein that conscription of state officers inherently violates the
rule against commandeering state legislatures. Instead, the role
of New York in Printz was methodological. Justice O'Connor had
enunciated a binding rule on how courts will reach their
decision once the structural issue has been addressed, and
Justice Scalia applied this rule to protect state executive
sovereignty.
155. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2398 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The 'take title' provision at
issue in New York was beyond Congress' authority to enact because it was 'in principle
S.. no different than a congressionally compelled subsidy from state governments to
radioactive waste producers,' almost certainly a legislative act. The majority relies upon
dictum in New York to the effect that '[the Federal Government may not compel the
States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.") (citations omitted).
156. Compare New York 505 U.S. at 163-65, with Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2389 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
157. New York, 505 U.S. at 178.
158. See discussion, supra, at 256 (explaining how Justice Scalia relied on
constitutional text which presupposes inviolable state sovereignty).
159. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2384.
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Justice O'Connor's explanation of this rule of decision in New
York, which is the essence of the Printz reasoning, is quoted in
its entirety in Printz and is as follows:
Much of the Constitution is concerned with setting forth the
form of our government, and the courts have traditionally
invalidated measures deviating from that form. The result
may appear "formalistic" in a given case to partisans of the
measure at issue, because such measures are typically the
product of the era's perceived necessity. But the Constitution
protects us from our own best intentions: It divides power
among sovereigns and among branches of government
precisely so that we may resist the temptation to concentrate
power in one location as an expedient solution to the crisis of
the day.16°
Because the "form" of our government was determined by
the Printz majority to require inviolable state sovereignty, and
because this structure would be altered if state officers were
commandeered to administer a federal regulatory program,
New York required the Printz Court to apply a bright line rule. It
is for this reason that, even if the New York rule that "[t]he
Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or
administer a federal regulatory program"161 was dicta, the
Printz majority had to follow that dicta in light of its own
structural analysis.
Printz's categorical holding that "[tihe Federal Government
may neither issue directives requiring the States to address
particular problems, nor command the States' officers, or those
of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a
regulatory program,"'162 is thus mandated by the Court's
understanding of the Constitution's structure.
CONCLUSION
As shown above, the Printz Court could not have reached its
result without strict adherence to a structural interpretation
based on inviolable, residual state sovereignty. It follows that
the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause will be
insufficient means to authorize commandeering of state officers
in any context, no matter how small the burden, or how
160. Id. at 2383 (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 187).
161. New York, 505 US. at 188.
162 Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2384.
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important the government's interest
Printz announced that any variation on the theme of forced
participation of state officers in the administration of a federal
regulatory program would not be tolerated, except insofar as
the power to regulate the subject matter was expressly
delegated by a constitutional provision.163 Dennison did not
recognize the existence of such provisions.j64 To the extent the
Printz Court recognized, sub silentio, the legitimacy of Puerto
Rico v. Branstad's overturning of Dennison, however, it did so
because it understood the Extradition Act to be "in direct
implementation of" the Extradition Clause of the
Constitution. 65 Yet the Dennison rule only provides a narrow
loophole because the only dear examples of such express
clauses are the Extradition Clause, the Militia Clauses, certain
election provisions, and the requirement that judges enforce
federal law under the Supremacy Clause.166 Notably, the
Commerce Clause would not qualify.
It has been suggested that Printz did not revive Dennison
because the Court failed to mention any intent to do so, and
because if Dennison were revived, the Printz opinion would sit
poorly with fifty years of prior jurisprudence.167 As to the first
point, Justice Stevens himself recognized that the principle of
state sovereignty in Dennison "resonates throughout the
majority opinion."168 And, as shown above, the principles and
163. See id. at 2379.
164. See Dennison, 65 US. 66.
165. Printz, 117 S. Ct at 2371-72, 2372 n.3.
166. See Caminker, supra note 20, at 1032-33, for a discussion of these clauses. One
alternative way to view the Pntz holding is under an "expres.o unius" theory-by
implication of those clauses of the constitution which specifically call for
commandeering of state officers, any other clauses of the constitution must be
interpreted as not granting this power. The expresio unius view has been criticized
because of the plausibility in interpreting specific clauses like the extradition clause "to
imply the inclusion of unenumerated but relevantly similar items." Id. at 1032-33. But
Justice Scalia's reliance on clauses which specifically presuppose state sovereignty
undermines this critique-if there were no Extradition Clause, it seems clear Justice
Scalia would have reached the same result in interpreting the Necessary and Proper
Clause. Printz thus effects a foundation of inviolable state sovereignty identical to the
one in Dennison, but with specific exceptions.
167. See Note, supra note 26, at 215-17 ("[]f the Court truly intended a blanket
prohibition against all federal commandeering-a return to the 19th century view that it
overruled in Puerto Rico v. Branstad-then its announcement could hardly have been
more cloaked, both in light of what Printz left unaddressed and, especially, when the
decision is read together with the Court's prior fifty years of Tenth Amendment
jurisprudence.") Id. at 217.
168. Prints, 117 S. Ct. at 2400 n.30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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holding in Printz are functionally indistinguishable from
Dennison in most cases, as the Court only recognized expressly
delegated exceptions to Dennison's rule. As -for prior
jurisprudence, Printz was dearly in the same analytical spirit as
New York, and may even have been required by that Court's
substantive holding. Any argument that the Court has
embarked on a new interpretation of federalism must recognize
that the Printz doctrine was launched in the 1992 New York
decision. The formalism of Printz precludes any difficulty at all
in interpreting its reach in light of precedent-prior
jurisprudence which requires balancing tests or case-by-case
analysis is simply overruled to that extent The complexities of
enforcing Printz only exist within a functionalist framework.
There are important laws which may now be held to contain
unconstitutional provisions.1 69 As Justice Stevens noted, Printz
may jeopardize federal requirements "such as registering
young adults for the draft, creating emergency response
commissions designed to manage the release of hazardous
substances, collecting and reporting data on environmental
hazard[s], and reporting traffic fatalities [as well as] missing
children."170 Justice Stevens' parade of horrors is little more
than a bugbear, however. It is hard to imagine a reason why a
state would decline to report traffic fatalities or missing
children to the federal government. A requirement that states
consent before administering federal programs is only likely to
obligate federal enforcement in those circumstances where the
federal regulation is unpopular in the particular state, much as
the Brady Act may be unpopular in states with populations
that strongly believe in the right to bear arms.'
169. See Caminker, supra note 20, at 1003, r3. See also Jackson, supra note 27, at 2205
(discussing the range of statutes which may be implicated by Printz, depending on the
breadth of Justice O'Connor's reservations.) Professor Jackson suggests that generally
applicable statutes, such as the Fair Labor Standards Act, the income tax withholding
statutes, and Title VII might be affected if Printz were extended.
However, one court has already refused to extend Printz to the Fair Labor Standards
Act, see West v. Anne Arundel County, Md, 137 F.3d 752 (4th Cir. 1998), and another has
refused to extend Printz to federal statutes enacted pursuant to Congress's powers
under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment see McGany v. Director, Dept. of
Revenue, -- F.Supp. 2d -- , 1998 WL 289760, *3-4 (W.D. Mo. May 20, 1998). But see
Condon v. Reno, 1998 WL 559659, *9 (4th Cir.(S. C.)) (invalidating the Driver's Privacy
Protection Act under Prints and rejecting Fourteenth Amendment arguments under City
ofBoerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct 2157 (1997)).
170. Print, 117 S. Ct. at 2394.
171. The importance of this right in our constitutional system did not escape Justice
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In the long run, Printz may represent a shift in doctrine
without a corresponding immediate impact on the
administration of our government, much as Lopez was to the
Commerce Clause.'72 Immediately after the decision, several
federal courts took note of Printz but avoided applying its
doctrine to their facts.j73 However, future statutes may be so
unpopular in certain regions that they could only be enforced
by requiring the commandeering of state officers, and in those
situations Printz may preserve diversity among the states. As a
functional matter, states will at least have better bargaining
power due to the revival of their constitutional, structural
sovereignty.
Recently, the Printz doctrine of dual sovereignty has found a
sympathetic ear in the courts. The Driver's Privacy Protection
Act (DPPA) is a federal statute which regulates disclosure of
personal information from motor vehicle records 74 Among its
provisions is a prohibition against "any person" knowingly
disclosing such information,175 as well as the following rule:
"[a]ny State department of motor vehicles that has a policy or
practice of substantial noncompliance ... shall be subject to
civil penalty imposed by the Attorney General of not more than
$5,000 a day for each day of substantial noncompliance." 76
Moreover, there is a criminal fine and civil cause of action
against anyone who knowingly violates the statute. 77
Thomas's attention. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2385 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("This Court
has not had recent occasion to consider the nature of the substantive right safeguarded
by the Second Amendment. If however, the Second Amendment is read to confer a
personal right to 'keep and bear arms,' a colorable argument exists that the Federal
Government's regulatory scheme, at least as it pertains to purely intrastate sale of
possession of firearms, runs afoul of that Amendment's protections. As the parties did
not raise the argument, however, we need not consider it here.").
172. See Stephen R. McAllister, Is There a Judicially Enforceable Limit to Congressional
Power Under the Commerce Clause?, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 217, 219 (1996) ("[lit does not
appear that the Court's decision worked any revolutionary curtailment of
congressional power."); and see id. at 219 n.20 (citing Supreme Court actions
immediately following the Lopez decision which curtailed its effect).
173. See, e.g., City of New York v. U.S., 971 F. Supp. 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); West v.
Anne Arundel County, 137 F.3d 752 (1998); McGarry v. Director, Dept. of Revenue, --
F.Supp.2d -- , (W.D. Mo. May 20,1998); Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1997);
Deer Park Indep. School Dist v. Harris County Appraisal Dist, 132 F.3d 1095 (1998);
Pryor v. Reno, 998 F. Supp. 1317 (1998); Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, -F.
Supp.2d-, 1998 WL 310477 (S.D. Ind. 1998).
174. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2721-25 (West Supp. 1998).
175. Id. § 2722(a).
176. Id. at §2723(b).
177. See id. §§ 2723(a), 2724(a).
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One district court distinguished the DPPA from the statute in
Printz on the grounds that it "requires no affirmative action by
the State or its officer," but "[r]ather, the DPPA merely
prohibits States from disclosing personal DMV records for any
impermissible purpose."178
In contrast, a number of district courts held that Printz was
controlling. 79 In Condon v. Reno, °80 the Fourth Circuit, citing
Printz and City of Boerne v. Flores,'8' ruled that Congress lacked
the authority under the Commerce Clause or Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment to enact the DPPA.j82 Judge
Williams held that the DPPA is not a generally applicable law
of the Garcia sort because only state governments run
departments of motor vehicles. 83 As a result, the DPPA was
subject to the strict requirements of Printz. It is noteworthy that
the Fourth Circuit was constrained by the formal, structuralist
nature of Printz. Despite the Court's agreement with the United
States' argument that the DPPA differed from the Brady Act
because it "does not conscript state officers to enforce the
regulations established by Congress,"' the Court followed Printz
because "[n]evertheless, state officials must, as the district court
found, administer the DPPA."184
As this article goes to press, the Seventh and Tenth Circuits
have both disagreed with the Fourth Circuit.185 The crux of
their reasoning is that the DPPA regulates information
dissemination, and only impacts states incidentally,186 or as
market participants' 87-the exception for generally applicable
178. Pryor v. Reno, 998 F. Supp. 1317,1329 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
179. See, e.g., Condon v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 977, 985 (D.S.C. 1997); Travis v. Reno,
No. 97-C-701-C, 1998 WL 307747, *7 (W.D. Wis. June 9,1998); Oklahoma v. United
States, 994 F. Supp. 1358,1363 (W.D. Okla. 1997).
180. 155 F3d 453 (4th Cir.(S.C.)).
181. 117S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
18Z See Condon, 155 F.3dat463, 465.
183. See id at 461 ("Of course, there is no private counterpart to a state Department
of Motor Vehicles.").
184. Id. at 460.
185. See Travis v. Reno, 1998 WL 871038 (7th Cir. 1998); State of Oklahoma v. United
States, 161 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 1998).
186. See State of Oklahoma, 161 F.3d at 1271 ("Unlike the federal statute in New York,
the DPPA does not commandeer the state legislative process by requiring state to enact
legislation regulating the disclosure of such information and preempts contrary state
law.").
187. See Travis, 1998 WL 871038 at *4 ("Because the Driver's Privacy Protection Act
affects states as owners of data, rather than as sovereigns, it does not commandeer
states in violation of the Constitution. Wisconsin is no more a regulator or law enforcer
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laws need not require regulation of both states and private
parties in the same statute.188 This interpretation of Printz may
leave its structural holding intact depending upon how quick
courts are to find "general applicability."189
But Judge Easterbrook's declaration in the Seventh Circuit-
"[Tihe anticommandeering rule comes into play only when the
federal government calls on the states to use their sovereign
powers as regulators of their citizens" 190-although it may be
dictum in support of his view that the DPPA does not regulate
states as sovereigns, is overly narrow and could be read by
other courts in such a way as to permit laws whose object is to
command state governments.i91
The initial case law stemming from Printz leaves it unclear to
what extent courts will apply the doctrine of dual sovereignty
to federal statutes without the balancing tests of old. As the
Supreme Court now holds, the Constitution's. structure
demands no less:
Where ... it is the whole object of the law to direct the
functioning of the state executive, and hence to compromise
the structural framework of dual sovereignty . . . a
'balancing' analysis is inappropriate. It is the very principle
of separate state sovereignty that such a law offends and no
when it decides what information to release from its database than is the comer
Blockbuster Video outlet").
188. See id. at*5 ("Discrimination against states is forbidden, but a nondiscriminatory
system may take more than one law to implement"). Although Judge Easterbrook
rightly rejects discrimination against states, the Seventh and Tenth Circuit's apparent
view that the presence of commandeering depends on the type of governmental
function implicated is slightly different from Justice Scalia's test, which is based on the
object of the federal law and makes no such distinction. A federal law, for example,
which created one minimum wage for states and another for private industry could
have as its object the commandeering of the state, despite the fact that employment is a
non-governmental function. The discrimination in this example would be an indicator
of the commandeering, and thus its presence would coincide with the statute's
unconstitutionality, but it is not the discrimination itself that Printz controls, but the not
incidental infringement of sovereignty.
189. In this respect, the Tenth Circuit opinion is troubling for its occasional resort to
functionalism. See State of Oklahoma, 161 F.3d at 1271 ("Oppressive federal regulation
that 'commandeers' a state's sovereign functions is less likely to arise where the law is
aimed at both private and public entities. This is so because generally applicable laws
are not aimed at uniquely governmental functions. Moreover, laws affecting both
private and public interests are subject to stricter political monitoring by the private
sector.").
190. Travis, 1998 WL 871038, at *4.
191. For example, Judge Easterbrook's interpretation might permit federal statutes
whose object was to regulate state administrative functions, on the theory that such
functions have private counterparts and do not regulate citizens, yet this would seem
to be a very meddlesome form of encroachment on state sovereignty.
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comparative assessment of the various interests can
overcome that fundamental defect. 9 2
192. Printz, 117 S. Ct at 2383. It is also arguable that a statute which on its face does
not violate state sovereignty could run afoul of the Printz rule, although this issue is
unaddressed in Printz. Professor Van Alstyne has suggested that statutes which have as
their true object the "illegitimate use" of an enumerated power may be unconstitutional
despite otherwise meeting the test for an enumerated power. See William Van Alstyne,
Federalism, Congress, the States, and the Tenth Amendment: Adrift in the Cellophane Sea, 1987
DUKE L J. 769 ("The argument presented here is that the same kind of 'illegitimate use'
analysis Justice Frankfurter invoked in the cellophane-wrapped tax case is, contrary to
the conventional view, equally applicable to commerce power cases and every other
enumerated power case as well").
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